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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Trial Court erred in dismissing Petitioner's Petition for failing to state a 
prime afacie case for factual innocence. Petitioner has clearly shown sufficient facts 
upon which a finding of factual innocence could be made. Even the Trial Court 
concedes \: -u . <-e c •, k.oncj 'makes 1...: . •* i>; ..^ii Petitioner committed the crime". 
case before that factual innoceiice. 
The State argues that some or most of the evidence presented was known to 
Defendant and/or his counsel at the time of Trial, but was not properly presented to 
l 
the Jury. The State incorrectly maintains that only evidence not known to Defendant 
or his counsel at the time of Trial may be presented here. The original conviction has 
no legal effect, having been reversed; and all evidence of innocence must be 
presented and considered. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT HAS MADE A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR FACTUAL INNOCENCE 
The State, in its Statement of Facts, referred to the robbery and the trial. As to 
that trial, the State made the following statement (St. Br. P.7): 
In closing argument, the State pointed out that, although Miller was living in 
Louisiana at the time of the robbery, nobody could account for his whereabouts 
between November 28,2000, andDecember 13,2000. The State explained that 
this time gap allowed Miller time to travel to Salt Lake City to visit his brother, 
commit the robbery, and return to Louisiana. The State also noted that the 
effects of Miller's stroke were likely mild as he was released from the hospital 
after only four (4) days. (Page Citations Omitted). 
At trial, the State presented a case which contained a two (2) week gap during 
which Mr. Miller could have come to Utah, ostensibly to visit his brother. Since that 
time, the gap has substantially narrowed. It is true that Judge McCleve, on remand 
from the Court of Appeals, heard additional evidence which did not impress her as 
sufficient to alter the results. She was still not impressed by the evidence presented 
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presented to the Jury was reduced substantial!)/ ; by good, fin n evidence ft omaCoi irt 
proceeding in Louisiana, and the notes and verified statement of the home care nurse. 
The trial judge, in her ruling of September 30,2008, backed off substantially from her 
previous ruling, but ended up with the same decision: 
Although the evidence makes it unlikely that Petitioner committed the crime, 
the Court reviewed this evidence as part of a remand from the court of appeals 
and determined that there was "no reasonable probability of a different 
outcome at trial even if [the new witnesses] had testified." (Emphasis added). 
That statemei it is now inten ial 1) ' ii icoi isistent to tl le point tl ial: itcai mot si istain 
the Trial Court's ruling. If "the evidence makes it unlikely that Petitioner committed 
the crime" there is a substantial "probability of a different outcome at trial." That, of 
course, was acknowledged by the Salt Lake District Attorney in his decision not to 
prosecute further. I 'he State, (St. Br. 31) points out that even a "not guilty" verdict 
(\\ •: •. .:* • • :.;inic as acukii innocence. The jurv couui :,a\e .v;iewju me 
doubt. In this case, the ti ial ji ldge foi ii id tl lat it is ii n ilikel} " tl lat Defendant 
committed the crime. That is far stronger than the existence of a reasonable doubt; 
and Defendant suggest that it approaches the "clear and convincing" standard of 
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innocence close enough to defeat a motion under Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
POINT II 
IT IS NOT SIGNIFICANT THAT SOME OF THE EVIDENCE OF INNOCENCE 
WAS AVAILABLE, OR MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE AT THE ORIGINAL 
TRIAL 
In Point II of its Brief, the State contends that the fact that Defendant's 
conviction was reversed on appeal, and that there was no retrial, is not evidence of 
actual innocence. The State goes on the quote the Senator who sponsored the 
legislation under which this action is brought: "the mere fact that the prisoner has 
been released from jail does not establish the right to have a claim under this fund." 
The State goes on to say "cases are frequently reversed or dismissed for reasons that 
have nothing to do with whether the defendant is factually innocent." While that may 
well be true, this is not such an instance. It is extremely important that the 
foundations for the State's case, which resulted in a guilty verdict at trial, have since 
been severely eroded. Under those circumstances, it is not important whether defense 
counsel knew, should have known, or might have known, more about possible 
defenses at the time of trial. It is not important to note that he was not found to have 
been ineffective, in a constitutional sense, upon remand from the Court of Appeals. 
4 
near enough evidence to have convicted Defendant of the 11 h o c charged. Whether 11le 
State wants to admit it iii its Brief; the State has previously so admitted it by its 
actions in stipulating to a reversal ai id in refusing to retry the case. The example 
previously cited, new evidence which severely restricts the window \ • 1rich 
Defendant could have been absent from tiic Male oi Louisiana, is but one example. 
'Ihi1 Si id 111 ill illiiul! .iflat'L'i ,\|i|irll,iiil i, nlnidh n lh.il I In: i ; r nitness 
iilcntilicatioii has simv also been se\ riv|y disnumlnl. ( hi paj^ e 2h jixl ?. / ol ills Brief, 
the State contends that the concessions of the prosecutor on the eye witness testimony 
are insignificant. That Brief refers to evidence that one of the eye witnesses had 
identified the perpetrator of the crime as someone "who came into the store once in 
a while." The State goes on to say "petitioner apparently believes that the eye witness 
mi ist be mistaken, because a; uu ia,,e . i ' e enme, petitioner was living in 
Attorney assigned to this case (one of the senior Deputy Prosecutors in the office) 
found this to be a compelling reason not to prosecute further. It is true, of course, that 
"the fact that the Deputy District Attorney had some questions about this witnesses 
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[sic] identification of petitioner as a customer does not establish that petitioner is 
innocent." (St. Br. 26-27). But the State is simply misstating the facts, when it 
prefaces this statement by saying: "The credibility of the victim's eyewitness 
testimony has never been questioned by the State." (St. Br. 26). That evidence, given 
two years after the robbery, was never strong enough to convict without some 
corroboration. The victim testified that the police report which stated that she had 
described her assailant as "between eighteen and twenty-one years old" must have 
been a mistake.(St. Br. 4). (Oops!) The prosecuting attorney's concerns over the 
reliability of the eyewitness testimony were sufficient to cause the charges to be 
dropped. It adds another nail in the coffin of the case. If the eye witness identification 
is considered unreliable; and if Defendant can be shown to have been in Louisiana 
for most of the time at issue, there is no longer any case for guilt. In its statement of 
facts, the State seeks to make "sense" of the thin ice its case rests upon by stating in 
a footnote (St. Br. 23) that "Petitioner also ignores the fact that, in addition to stealing 
the woman's purse, he also tried to steal her car - perhaps in order to drive back to 
Louisiana". The State elsewhere alleges, of course, that the only way that Defendant 
could have been in Utah on the day of the robbery, and in Louisiana just before and 
just after, was by flying. (St. Br. 22). Such a suggestion only underlines the 
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flimsiness of the State's position at this time. 
The State combines its arguments that there is insufficient evidence of 
innocence, with its argument that Defendant must "show that the information 
regarding innocence was unknown to him or his counsel at the time of the original 
trial5'. Defendant contends that if the evidence of innocence is sufficient, and if there 
is no standing conviction, it does not matter what was known at the time of trial. This 
statute treads a thin line. It seeks to compensate someone who was incarcerated for 
a crime that he did not commit; and it seeks to avoid compensating someone whose 
conviction is set aside because of Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations, or some 
other "constitutional technicality". But the State has wound itself up in procedural 
red tape. What is most important here is that Defendant was incarcerated for four and 
a half years for a crime that the trial Court concedes that "it [is] unlikely that 
petitioner committed". Petitioner is not asking this Court to enter a finding of factual 
innocence. He is merely asking the Court to order an evidentiary hearing at which all 
of the evidence, as it stands now, can be weighed, and in which Defendant stands a 
chance of being found factually innocent. Defendant has indeed stated a cause of 
action, and this matter should not have been dismissed under Rule 12(b). It is not 
important, as the State argues (St. Br. 18-19) that some of the evidence was known 
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to Defendant's trial counsel, but was not presented fully at trial. If there had been a 
second trial, Defendant could have presented all available evidence, and would not 
have been constrained by the first trial. Because the conviction now has no legal 
standing, all evidence available may be presented. If the evidence points to factual 
innocence, compensation must be awarded. 
The State claims that the statutory language is "plain and unambiguous" in 
requiring the Defendant to jump through ah hoops of procedure. But it makes 
absolutely no sense to suggest that Defendant must prove that his original trial 
counsel was ineffective in order to obtain the chance now to prove his innocence. 
Whether or not his original trial counsel was ineffective, the conviction did not stand. 
Whether or not his trial counsel was ineffective, the State refused to even make an 
attempt at a second conviction. Whether or not his trial counsel was ineffective, the 
trial Judge, who ruled that evidence presented to her on remand was insufficient to 
raise "reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial" has now conceded that 
"The evidence makes it unlikely that petitioner committed the crime". The State 
concedes (St. Br. 34) that it earlier stipulated to the reversal of the conviction because 
"there was an error in the trial proceedings and that the interests of justice dictate that 
the defendant receive a new trial". This was after the trial judge had found no such 
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errors. The concession by the State was as major statement to the effect that the trial 
court had erred. It must be read to call into question the trial court's remand ruling; 
but the State concedes nothing. Whatever the "error" might have been (which 
remains a mystery, it seems), it was sufficient to reverse the conviction. Now the 
State seems to be claiming that there were no serious errors in the trial proceeding., 
at least not one sufficient to warrant a new evidentiary hearing on factual innocence. 
That position is untenable. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's ruling that there is insufficient cause to hold an evidentiary 
hearing on the Petition is neither factually nor legally sound, and this Court should 
order such a hearing to be held. Since it has been conceded that the trial proceedings 
contained a serious error sufficient to reverse the conviction, and since the trial judge 
does not appear to recognize the error, a new district court judge should be appointed 
9 
to hear this matter from a fresh viewpoint. 
DATED this \zj_ day of June, 2009. 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGHJL.L.C. 
Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Appellant 
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